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TAB A to  
IAC-D-77/1  
28 December 1953

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23 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert M. Macy  
Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT: Budgetary Analysis of Intelligence Programs

1. In response to your 17 November 1953 request for advice and assistance from the Intelligence Advisory Committee in the development of a more adequate budgetary analysis of U.S. intelligence programs and more specifically in the formulation of a categorized approach to budgetary analysis, there is attached a suggested initial listing of categories to accomplish these purposes.

2. In keeping with the understanding reached at the IAC meeting at which you were present, internal security programs are excluded from the categories as they will be excluded from the analysis.

3. Based on informal consultation, it is my understanding that you believe these categories will be suitable to assist you, at least in the initial stages, to achieve the objectives outlined by you on 17 November to the IAC.

4. As the survey proceeds, the Bureau should feel free to call upon the IAC for additional assistance, as appropriate. It would be appreciated if the Bureau's findings would be made available to the IAC.

/s/ Robert Amory, Jr.  
for  
ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

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Suggested Categories for the Survey of Intelligence Budgets

1. The major categories should be restricted to the classical classification of intelligence, namely: collection, production and dissemination.

2. The category "collection" should be divided as overt and covert.

3. Intelligence activities under the category "production" should be further classified as follows:

- a. Political, cultural and sociological
- b. Ground Forces
- c. Naval Forces
- d. Air Forces
- e. Economic
- f. Scientific and Technical

4. No attempt has been made to classify "production" or the subdivisions of "production" as basic, current and national intelligence. Such a division, if made, would be unrealistic, inasmuch as in some agencies the employment of personnel on these respective categories of intelligence will vary with the intensity of international relations and crises. There is no formula thus far discovered or used among the agencies which could indicate the actual allocation of total resources to those categories of intelligence.

5. The category "dissemination," for the sake of uniformity in the survey, should include screening, reproduction, translation, distribution and libraries, although the relationship of those functions to both production and collection is recognized.

6. In connection with these activities, whether by intelligence or by operations, which serve purposes other than intelligence, the approximate intelligence cost should be broken out and listed. This is particularly applicable to certain problems in collection, but is not necessarily restricted to collection.

TAB B to  
IAC-D-77/1  
28 December 1953

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TAB A

PROPOSAL TO PERMIT THE STRENGTHENING  
OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Problem:

1. To determine ways and means whereby the DCI can ensure that the intelligence components which make up the federal intelligence system obtain sufficient budgetary support to be able to undertake intelligence activities essential to the national security.

Discussion:

2. It is clear that the intent of the National Security Act and the NSCIDs is that the Agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee are to operate insofar as possible as a system, interrelated and interdependent. While the Act and the Directives accord due respect to the fact that the individual intelligence agencies must meet their departmental responsibilities, the separate agencies are to be so managed as to achieve coordinated intelligence in the interest of national security.

3. The injunction in the Law that the Central Intelligence Agency (and therefore, in NSCID-1, the Director, with the concurrence or dissent of the IAC) is to recommend to the NSC measures necessary for the coordination of such intelligence activities as relate to the national security has a positive implication: that those activities are to be made stronger, more effective, and more efficient. A weakness developing with respect to any of the agencies is immediately the concern of the responsible intelligence chief. If the weakness will affect the national security, it also becomes the concern of the DCI. In some such cases, the weakness can be corrected by the responsible chief alone; in others, the correction may transcend his ability, in which event the support of the DCI and the IAC, or the NSC, may properly be required.

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4. By virtue of Mr. Armstrong's letter (see Tab B, which was discussed by the IAC on 15 September 1953, IAC-M-121) a point has been reached where we must examine whether or not a Congressional or departmental decision to reduce an intelligence activity which relates to the national security can remain solely a departmental matter. While this particular case involves a weakening of certain activities in the Foreign Service, comparable reductions in military agencies' reporting capabilities or in the intelligence agencies' production capabilities might well have similar adverse effects on the national security.

5. In order for the federal intelligence system to be maintained in a healthy state and its integral parts balanced insofar as possible, it appears that two courses of action would be desirable:

a) Where departmental intelligence activities are deemed essential to the national security, the DCI, after consultation with the IAC, should provide appropriate support in the presentation of such budget items to the Bureau and the Congress and, if necessary, to the department or agency concerned when it comes to allocation of its appropriation among the various components of that department or agency. This would ensure that the Bureau of the Budget, the Congress, and the department or agency, in considering a departmental appropriation, would have full cognizance of that national security implications of functions which otherwise might be thought to be exclusively to meet departmental needs.

b) Where the department or agency has been performing or should perform services (in addition to those required for departmental use) for the benefit of CIA and the community, the DCI, in cooperation with the department or agency should define the needed services. The DCI might, by mutual understanding, then budget for these additional services and reimburse the department or agency for such.

6. To date, CIA has not, by and large, carried out the procedure described in 5 (a) above. CIA has been in certain instances operating on the thesis set forth in 5 (b) above. The Agency has reimbursed the State Department for the following intelligence services:

a) National Intelligence Survey, in order to carry out for the DCI in the most efficient way his responsibility for

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NIS. (While thus far CIA has not similarly reimbursed the military intelligence agencies for NIS production, it would be better, both from the point of view of the Congress and the DCI, if CIA budgeted for their research also.)

b) External Research Staff, on the ground that such coordinating efforts could be best operated out of the Department of State and for the benefit of the community, including CIA.

c) Political and cultural biographic intelligence for services rendered to CIA, while at the same time CIA discontinued similar biographic intelligence which it had earlier developed.

7. In none of the foregoing instances was CIA specifically directed by the NSC to reimburse the Department of State for services rendered, though in the external research case the concurrence of the Psychological Strategy Board was sought and obtained. As far as is known, CIA has not provided funds to the military intelligence agencies for services rendered, although at one point during the last year, G-2 was favorably considering the possibility of receiving NIS funds along the line of the State Department arrangement.

Recommendations:

8. That the IAC agree in principle to the following:

Where departmental intelligence activities are deemed essential to the national security, the DCI, after consultation with the IAC, should provide appropriate support in the presentation of such budget items to the Bureau and the Congress and, if necessary, to the department or agency concerned, when it comes to allocation of its appropriation among the various components of that department or agency. This would ensure that the Bureau of the Budget, the Congress, and the department or agency, in considering a departmental appropriation, would have full cognizance of the national intelligence implications of functions which otherwise might be thought to be exclusively to meet departmental needs.

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9. That the IAC approve the following procedure to implement the foregoing policy:

The DCI shall, in cooperation with the departments or agencies individually or collectively as necessary, define those departmental intelligence activities which are deemed essential to the national security. The DCI shall be provided sufficiently in advance of the department or agency's presentation to the Bureau and the Congress with the necessary departmental budget data to permit him to provide appropriate support to the Bureau and the Congress. Upon approval of appropriations by Congress, the recipient department or agency shall make available to the DCI at the earliest possible date the tentative departmental allocation for the intelligence activities in question, in order that the DCI may, if necessary, make an appropriate presentation to the department or agency concerned.

10. That the IAC concur in the proposed revisions in the NSCIDs 1 and 2 as follows:

NSCID-1  
para. 11

The intelligence organizations, within the limits of their capabilities, shall provide, or procure, such intelligence as may be requested by the Director of Central Intelligence or by one of the other departments or agencies. Where such requests involve additional expenditure of funds, reimbursement following agreement between the heads of the responsible organizations shall be provided in accordance with 31 U. S. C. 686, as follows: by the DCI when the request serves the needs of CIA or the intelligence community; or by another department or agency when its specific needs are served solely by the request. Budget estimates will include provision for such reimbursement.

NSCID-2  
para. 4

The collecting and reporting facilities of each of the agencies shall be utilized so as to avoid /unproductive/ duplication and /uncoordinated/ overlap and to ensure /within budgetary limitations/ within the capabilities of the intelligence community that full flow of intelligence information /which is the major need of all/ required by the respective departments and agencies for the accomplishment of their respective missions and for the production of national intelligence. (Deletion in brackets, insertion underlined.)

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11. It is recommended that the IAC concur in the following procedure to implement the foregoing NSCID revisions:

The DCI shall submit, after consultation with the departments or agencies individually or collectively as necessary, to the IAC a statement of those services in addition to those required for departmental use which are of benefit to CIA and the community. The CIA budget request will include provision for reimbursing the appropriate agencies for such additional services, and to the extent that Congress appropriates funds to CIA pursuant to such budget request, CIA will effect the reimbursement in accordance with 31 U.S.C. 686.